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Detecting Bad Crypto Implementations and Correcting Random Oracles
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报告题目:Detecting Bad Crypto Implementations and Correcting Random Oracles

报告人:Moti Yung教授,Columbia University and Google , USA

报告时间:20181221  930-1030

报告地点:文津楼3628

报告摘要:The study of Cryptosystems that are under subversion by the implementers themselves led to attacks (called Kleptographic attacks) on black-box cryptosystems. These type of attacks first introduced theoretically, have been implemented in the real, and are threatening the security of systems. In recent years we have investigated how to build systems, relying on minimal trusted component so as to clip the power of such attacks (we called it Cliptography). I will review methods for correcting implementations against unstructured hash functions (modeled as random oracles) based on some public randomness, and will mention black-box detection strategies against cryptosystems implemented adversarially.

报告人介绍: Moti Yung is a Security and Privacy Scientist with a main interest in Cryptography: its Theory and its Real life Applications. Currently he is with Google. He graduated from Columbia University in 1988 and is an adjunct senior research faculty at Columbia till today. In parallel he has had an industrial research career working at places like IBM, RSA Labs. (EMC), and Snap. Yung is a fellow of ACM, of IEEE, of the International Association for Cryptologic Research (IACR). and of the European Association for Theoretical Computer Science (EATCS). Among his awards are ACM's SIGSAC Outstanding Innovation Award in 2014, and 2018 IEEE Computer Society W. Wallace McDowell Award. His research covers broad areas: from the theory and foundations, to applied systems, and actual engineering industrial efforts of cryptography and secure systems.